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Abstract
Unemployment shows persistent and long lasting responses to nominal and real shocks.
Standard real business cycle models with search frictions but homogeneous labor force are able
to generate some persistence, but not enough to match the empirical evidence. Moreover,
empirical studies emphasize the importance of the heterogeneity of the unemployment pool
to fully understand unemployment dynamics. In particular, in most European countries the
incidence of long term unemployment is big and well known. One of the causes/consequences
of long-term unemployment is the skill deterioration of the unemployment pool. In this paper
we introduce the loss of skill mechanism, and therefore an heterogeneous labor force, in a New
Keynesian framework with search frictions. Calibrating the model to the Spanish economy,
we show that the loss of skill mechanism helps to explain the persistence in the response of
unemployment to monetary shocks.
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11 Introduction
There is a vast literature documenting the response of macroeconomic variables such as output,
inﬂation, monetary aggregates, and interest rates to nominal shocks1. However, only in the last few
years have scholars started to study the e ects of such shocks on labor market variables. Among
others, Merz (1995) and more recently Walsh (2005) show that standard business cycle models
that focus solely on the intensive margin lack the level of detail needed to understand the linkage
between labor market variables and nominal shocks. In order to improve the understanding of this
linkage, a growing number of papers utilize the search and matching framework of Mortensen and
Pissarides (1994) to introduce frictions in the labor market. Merz (1995), Andolfatto (1996), and
den Haan, Haefke and Watson (2000) all show that the introduction of search frictions not only
generates important di erences in the dynamics of employment and hours worked, but also helps
to explain the observed persistence in labor market variables. More recently, Cooley and Quadrini
(1999), Walsh (2005), and Trigari (2009) have introduced nominal features into these models in
order to analyze the interaction between monetary policy and labor markets.
Most of these studies, however, focus primarily on employment and hours, with little emphasis on
the response of unemployment to such nominal shocks. The study of the response of unemployment
is important, since it is not simply the counterpart to the response of employment. These two pools
of workers can show di erent dynamics due to the presence of institutions as well as the di erent
risks and incentives they face.
Moreover, all of the papers mentioned above assume that all of the workers are homogeneous
except in their employment statuses. In understanding the dynamics of labor markets, however, a
number of authors stress the importance of accounting for the heterogeneity of the unemployment
pool. In particular, recent research has claimed that part of the persistence of the cycles is due
to this heterogeneity. Machin and Manning (1999) provide an extensive analysis of the causes and
dynamics of long-term unemployment in Europe. Long-term unemployed are workers who su er
from prolonged unemployment spells; the length of an unemployment spell signiﬁcantly decreases
the probability of ﬁnding a new job at the individual level. Bover, Arellano and Bentolila (2002)
show that for the Spanish economy, the probability of ﬁnding a job decreases with the duration of
unemployment. Moreover at the macro level, Jackman and Layard (1991) ﬁnd that the exit rate
from unemployment decreases when there is a higher proportion of long-term unemployed workers.
Part of the literature stresses the role of institutions as the cause of long-term unemployment in
1See Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2000) for a review of this literature.
2aspects such as replacement ratio, beneﬁt duration, union coverage, and coordination. In the present
paper, we focus on the mechanism of skill loss. Prolonged detachment from a job can cause the
skill deterioration of the worker. In turn, skill deterioration renders workers less attractive to ﬁrms
because of their lower productivity or need to be retrained. This vicious cycle exacerbates the
duration of unemployment.
The loss of the skill mechanism has been used to analyze the di erences between the European
and U.S. labor markets. In particular Ljungqvist and Sargent (2004) and den Haan, Haefke, and
Ramey (2005) study the extent to which an increase in workers’ loss of skill could account for the
high increase in unemployment experienced in Europe during the 1980s. Though drawing di erent
conclusions, both agree on the importance in studying the loss of the skill mechanism for European
countries. Pissarides (1992) develops a search model with overlapping generations that embeds the
loss of the skill mechanism. He ﬁnds that skill loss can help to enhance the impact of temporary
shocks to the labor market.
Following this last reference, the focus of this paper is on the transitional e ects of skill loss on
the real and nominal variables of the economy due to a temporary nominal shock. We ﬁrst study
the empirical response of unemployment to a nominal shock, estimating a vector autoregression
(VAR) following Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2000) identiﬁcation procedure using Spanish
data. The high incidence of long-term unemployment in Spain makes this economy an excellent
candidate to test our model. We then develop a model that, taking into account the unemployment
heterogeneity mentioned earlier, is able to closely reproduce the empirical VAR responses. In
particular, we extend the model developed in Esteban-Pretel (2005) to include some of the standard
features of the New-Keynesian framework. We present an economy composed of inﬁnitely lived risk-
averse individuals, who decide how to best allocate their wealth between consumption and savings.
They supply labor to intermediate goods ﬁrms, which produce an homogenous good to be sold to the
retailers. Firms in the latter sector operate in monopolistic competition and price their goods over
their marginal cost. They change their prices following a Calvo type rule. The monetary authority
sets the nominal interest rate following a Taylor rule. Workers are heterogeneous in their skill level,
which can be high or low. The deterioration of skill is modeled as a constant probability of losing
the skill in every period in which the worker is unemployed, and the upgrade takes place during
employment at the ﬁrm. Labor markets are modeled following a search and matching framework 2.
2Recently, the use of search and matching models to study business cycle ﬂuctuations has been heavily criticized.
Shimer (2005) and Hall (2005) show that these types of models fail to reproduce the empirical volatility of the vacancy-
unemployment ratio due to the high variablility of wages. More recently, Andres, Domenech and Ferri (2006) show
that a New Keynesian business cycle model with search frictions and staggered prices is able to reconcile the theory
3In order to assess the performance of our model, we provide two sets of results. Firstly, we
show how a model with skill loss compares to a model with only one skill and to the data. We
show that our model generates a bigger and more persistent response of the variables to a nominal
shock than a model with one skill. The loss of skill mechanism, combined with the nominal and
real rigidities, helps the model to improve its match to the response of the labor market variables,
in particular unemployment. The intuition for the extra persistence delivered by the two-skills
model lies in the lower probability of re-employment for the low-skilled workers. When a negative
nominal shock hits the economy, proﬁts are reduced, unemployment increases, and the number of
vacancies posted drops. These e ects decrease the probability of workers to ﬁnd jobs, which in turn
implies that with time some of the high-skill workers lose their skill and enter the low-skill pool,
where they have an even lower probability of being hired. The increase in unemployment together
with the bigger proportion of low-skill unemployed workers greatly decreases the chances of re-
employment and increases the persistence of the response of the variables to the shock. Secondly,
we perform some robustness checks in order to understand the sensitivity of the results to changes in
important parameters in the model, such as the probability of losing the skill, the habit persistence
in consumption, and the persistence of the monetary authority instrument. We ﬁnd that changing
these parameters alters the dynamic responses of the variables to some extent, but that the model
with two skills still generates more persistent responses to monetary shocks in unemployment and
output.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 highlights the relevant empirical
facts of unemployment in Spain and describes the impulse responses of some nominal and real
variables to a monetary shock. Section 3 outlines the model. Section 4 explains the calibration.
Section 5 describes the results, and Section 6 concludes.
2 Spanish empirical evidence
The Spanish labor market has been widely studied by scholars. The change in institutions and the
impact of di erent shocks has deeply changed the composition of the unemployment pool. Most
of the studies concentrate on the role of institutions to understand the long-term unemployment
phenomenon (see Manchin and Manning (1999) for a comprehensive review). In this paper, we do
with the empirical evidence of the volatities mentioned earlier. The key mechanism in generating the higher volatilities
in Andres et al. (2006) is the sluggishness of price adjustments, a feature that our model also contains. Hence it is
possible that our model does not fail in the aspects noted by Shimer and Hall. However, since the focus of our paper
is the dynamic response of unemployment to monetary shocks and how this response is improved by modeling skill
loss, we do not pursue this issue further.
4not wish to explain the evolution of unemployment in Spain. We use the Spanish example to support
our claim that in macroeconomic models, it is necessary to account for the heterogeneity in the labor
market to better understand the impact of nominal shocks on the economy. In particular we are
interested in studying the composition of the unemployment pool with respect to the duration of
unemployment and possible skill deterioration.
We concentrate our analysis on the sample from the third quarter of 1989, after the entrance
of Spain into the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM), to the last quarter of 2000, before the struc-
tural changes in the unemployment survey of the “Instituto Nacional de Estatistica”. We classify as
long-term unemployed those workers who have been seeking a job for more than one year. The com-
plement is classiﬁed as short-term unemployed. The data are converted from monthly to quarterly
and are seasonally adjusted. In the last two decades, the unemployment rate reached as high as 23
percent, and dropped to as low as 10 percent. Long-term unemployment rate is the predominant
part of total unemployment for most of the sample. Only in recent years has short-term unemploy-
ment exceeded long-term. This last e ect is likely due to the recent surge in the use of short-term
contracts (Bentolila and Jimeno (2006)).
In comparison, when we study the decomposition of unemployment by duration for the U.S., we
ﬁnd a completely di erent picture. The Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) provides a categorization
of unemployment by duration that distinguishes between those unemployed for more or less than
6 months. Given this classiﬁcation, we ﬁnd that what we label as “long-term unemployment”
(workers who have been unemployed for more than six months) was at a maximum 25 percent of
total unemployment at the beginning of the 1980s in a sample spanning from the ﬁrst quarter of 1979
to the last quarter of 2003, when the average unemployment rate was 6 percent. This analysis shows
that Spain, and the European countries in general, are better candidates for analyzing the impact
of monetary policy shocks on the composition of the unemployment pool. Moreover, Blanchard and
Jimeno (1999) study Okun’s law for the Spanish economy and show that the e ect of a change in
output on the change of unemployment is high.
At a more micro level, Bover et al. (2002) show that for the Spanish economy, the probability
of ﬁnding a job decreases with the duration of unemployment. This is due to the fact that the long-
term unemployed are detached from a productive environment for long periods, which suggests a
positive correlation between the length of the unemployment spell and the probability of losing skill.
Hence, the length of the unemployment spell seems a good approximation of the skill deterioration
in the unemployment pool. This loss of skill mechanism forms the core of our model.
In order to evaluate the e ects of a monetary policy shock on the economy, we estimate a VAR.
5We follow the approach of Christiano et al. (2000) to identify the monetary policy shocks according
to which these are orthogonal to the information set of the monetary authority. We estimate two
di erent VARs. The ﬁrst includes the log of the real GDP, the annualized change in the log of
the GDP deﬂator, the log of the total unemployment rate and the log of the total hours worked
per worker. The monetary policy instrument is the three month interbank rate. In the second
VAR we replace the unemployment rate with two variables: the log of the long-term unemployment
rate and of the short-term unemployment rate. The source of the data is EUROSTAT, except
for unemployment and its disaggregation which, as stated above, were provided by the Spanish
“Instituto Nacional de Estatistica”, and for total hours worked that are provided by the OECD.
Figures 1 and 2 show the responses of the real and nominal variables to a 100 basis points shock
to interest rates. The dotted lines are the two standard deviations conﬁdence intervals. Since the
responses of GDP, inﬂation, hours, and interest rates are similar in the two estimations, we only
show that obtained by the ﬁrst VAR. We can see that following an increase in the nominal interest
rates, output decreases, as do inﬂation and total hours. Total unemployment increases. The e ects
on both output and unemployment take some time to fade, 13 quarters and 16 quarters, respectively.
When we examine the response of long-term and short-term unemployment rates, we notice that
these two variables respond di erently. Long-term unemployment peaks later than short-term, in
the eighth and ﬁfth periods, respectively. Furthermore, long-term unemployment displays a more
persistent response than the short rate.
Figure 1
Figure 2
3 The Model
The previous section shows the persistent response of unemployment and other macroeconomic
variables to monetary shocks. We now explain the model that we use to assess the role of the loss
of skill of unemployed workers in accounting for these persistent responses.
We use a discrete time, dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with four types of inﬁnitely
lived agents: consumers/workers, intermediate goods ﬁrms, retail ﬁrms and the monetary authority.
The population is composed of consumers organized in households. Each member of a household
can be employed and work in an intermediate goods ﬁrm, or unemployed and produce a home good.
Employed and unemployed individuals can be high skilled or low skilled. When high-skilled workers
6become unemployed, they face a positive probability of becoming low-skilled. The labor market in
the style of Mortensen and Pissarides (1994).
Firms that produce the intermediate goods can hire both types of workers. When they hire a
low-skilled worker they pay a cost to train him to become high-skilled. The training cost is shared
between the worker and the employer. We follow den Haan et al. (2000) and assume that an
employment relationship can be terminated because of causes exogenous to the match and because
of causes endogenous to the employer worker relationship. Retailers buy intermediate goods from
the intermediate ﬁrms, transform them into retail goods and sell them to the consumers. The
monetary authority sets the nominal interest rate of the economy.
We assume that consumers and ﬁrms in the economy make their decisions subject to the infor-
mation set of the previous period. This is consistent with the assumptions made in the identiﬁcation
of the monetary shocks in the empirical VAR.
3.1 Consumers
The economy is composed of a continuum of individuals of mass one, who consume and supply labor
to ﬁrms. Each individual has the following per period utility:
u(Ct,C t 1)   h(Lt), (1)
where
u(Ct,C t 1)=
1
1    c
(Ct   eCt 1)
1  c (2)
and
h(Lt)=an
1
1+ n
L
1+ n
t . (3)
Ct is the level of consumption and Lt the hours worked in period t.  c, n > 0 are the coe cients of
risk aversion to ﬂuctuations in consumption and hours worked. We assume that there is persistence
in the consumption of the individuals. e   1 is the habit persistence coe cient in consumption.
an > 0 is the weight on the disutility from supplying labor.
We assume that all of the individuals belong to a large family in which earnings from working
and nonwork activities are pooled together as an insurance mechanism3. Firms are owned by this
large household, and all of their proﬁts are distributed to it. In every period, consumers have the
opportunity to save by buying a one period risk-free bond, Bt, that pays
 
1+rn
t 1
 
in t, where rn
3This assumption, which is standard in the literature, allows the model to overcome the heterogeneity problems
resulting from the employment status of the agent.
7is the nominal interest rate. The household decides the level of consumption and savings in order
to maximize its lifetime utility.
Therefore, the household chooses {Ct+i,B t+i+1}
 
i=0 to max
Et 1
 
   
i=0
 i [u(Ct+i,C t+i 1)   Ht+i]
 
, (4)
subject to
Pt+iCt+i + Bt+i+1   Pt+i t+i + Pt+iWt+i +
 
1+rn
t+i 1
 
Bt+i + (1   nt+i)Pt+ib   Pt+itw
t nlt
for i = {0,..., },
where     1 is the discount rate of the economy. Ht is the disutility su ered by the household from
the hours supplied by its working members4. Hours of work do not appear explicitly, since they
are not chosen by the household but by decentralized bargaining between each ﬁrm and worker.
Pt is the price level in the economy.  t = 
f
t + r
t are the proﬁts rebated to the consumers from
the intermediate goods ﬁrms and the retailers. Wt is the sum of all the real wages paid to the
workers. nt is the number of employed workers. b is home production of those individuals who are
not working. tw
t nlt is the share of all the training costs which are paid by the workers, where tw
t is
the training cost per worker and nlt the number of low-skilled workers.
The problem of the household yields the following optimal conditions:
Et 1 t =  Et 1 (1 + rt) t+1 (5)
Ct    t + Wt + (1   nt+i)b + tw
t nlt, (6)
where (1 + rt)=
Pt
Pt+1
(1 + rn
t ) (7)
and  t =( Ct   eCt 1)
      e(Ct+1   eCt)
   .
Bonds do not appear in Equation (6) since in equilibrium they are in zero net supply.
3.2 Intermediate goods ﬁrms and workers
Intermediate goods ﬁrms produce goods which are sold to the retailers. They are price takers
and in order to produce, they need to engage in employment relationships with workers. These
relationships are composed of one ﬁrm and one worker.
4As we show later, hours of work are the same for all workers. The relationship between individual and total
disutility from work is hence Ht = nth(Lt), where nt is total employment in the economy, which is the sum of the
high and low-skill employment levels.
8As explained before, unemployed workers can be of two types, high or low-skilled. A worker who
has just been separated from a ﬁrm retains the high skill for some time, and is therefore classiﬁed
as high-skilled unemployed. While unemployed, high-skilled workers face a positive probability,  ,
of losing the skill and becoming low-skilled. Firms can hire either type of worker. Both types of
workers are equally productive, although the low-skilled employed must be trained, at a total cost
t, when hired. This cost is shared between the worker and the ﬁrm. Training takes one period, after
which the worker becomes high-skilled.
Vacant ﬁrms and unemployed workers meet randomly according to a constant return to scale
matching function m(ut,v t), where ut = ult +uht, ut is total unemployment, ult and uht are low (l)
and high (h) skilled unemployment, respectively, and vt is the number of vacancies. For later use,
we denote market tightness of the labor market as  t = vt
ut.
If the search process is successful, ﬁrms produce output according to the production function
yt = AL
 y
t where yt is the output level, A is the level of technology of the economy, and  y   [0,1].
The costs of production for the ﬁrm are the wages paid to the worker, the training cost, and
a ﬁxed cost  t. This latter cost, which can be interpreted as the cost of intermediate inputs other
than labor, is idiosyncratic to the ﬁrm, independent, and identically distributed across ﬁrms and
time, with distribution function F :[  min, max]   [0,1]. A new cost is drawn every period by the
ﬁrm.
Employment relationships are dissolved either exogenously, which occurs with probability  x,
or endogenously, if the cost of intermediate inputs is too high, and both ﬁrm and worker decide to
discontinue the relationship and explore other options. The value of   above which the match is
dissolved is denoted by ¯  t. There exists a di erent threshold cost for high-skilled matches, ¯  ht, and
low skilled matches, ¯  lt, since both types of matches face di erent costs and beneﬁts. For simplicity,
we assume that newly formed matches are subject to endogenous but not exogenous destruction.
The timing of the labor market is as follows. At the beginning of every period, a proportion
 x of matches which have been productive during the previous period are destroyed for exogenous
reasons. The remaining matched ﬁrms draw an intermediate input cost. This new cost, along with
the other determinants of the surplus (i.e. interest rate, price of the good, general price level,
level of technology), determine the new threshold of endogenous destruction ¯  it with i  {l,h} and
establishes total destruction. After destruction takes place, the levels of employment and high and
low-skilled unemployment are determined.
Value of posting a vacancy
9Posting vacancies has a ﬂow cost of k for the ﬁrm. A vacant ﬁrm matches with a worker of
type i  {l,h} with probability q
f
it =
m( t)
 t
uit
ut
. If the ﬁrm is matched and the idiosyncratic
shock is low enough, in the following period the ﬁrm obtains the value of being ﬁlled by a worker
of type i, otherwise it remains as a vacancy. Let Vt and Jit ( t) be the values, measured in terms of
consumption, of a vacancy and of a job ﬁlled by a worker of type i. Hence the value of a vacancy is
Vt =  k + Et 1 t
 
 q
f
ht
¯  ht+1  
 min
Jht+1 ( t+1)dF ( t+1) (8)
+q
f
lt
¯  lt+1  
 min
Jlt+1 ( t+1)dF ( t+1)+
 
1   q
f
htF (¯  ht+1)   q
f
ltF (¯  lt+1)
 
Vt+1
 
 ,
where  t =  
 t+1
 t
is the e ective discount factor, since ﬁrms are ultimately owned by households.
Free entry of ﬁrms is assumed in equilibrium, which implies that the value of a vacancy must
be zero in every period, Vt = Vt+1 =0 .
Value of a ﬁlled job for a ﬁrm
The value for a ﬁrm which hires a high-skilled worker is
Jht ( t)=xtAtL
 y
t    t   wht ( t)Lt + Et 1 t (1    x)
¯  ht+1  
 min
Jht+1 ( t+1)dF ( t+1). (9)
During the current period, given the ﬁrm’s idiosyncratic cost of intermediate inputs,  t, it produces
output, sells it to the ﬁnal goods ﬁrms at price xt, and pays wages and the cost of these inputs. The
following period, if the match survives the exogenous destruction, the ﬁrm draws a new intermediate
input cost. If the new cost is below the threshold, ¯  ht+1, the match is still productive, with a value
of Jht+1 ( t+1). Otherwise the match is destroyed and it becomes a vacancy, which has value zero.
A similar expression holds in the case of employing a low-skilled worker 5, except for the fact
that we need to account for the share of the training cost to the ﬁrm, t
f
t .
Jlt ( t)=xtAtL
 y
t    t   t
f
t   wlt ( t)Lt + Et 1 t (1    x)
¯  ht+1  
 min
Jht+1 ( t+1)dF ( t+1). (10)
5Note that since training only takes one period, the continuation value is the same as that of the ﬁrm hiring a
high-skilled worker.
10Given the previous expressions, we can deﬁne the total amount of ﬂow proﬁts made by interme-
diate goods ﬁrms as
 
f
t   nht
 
xtAtL
 y
t   ˜  ht   ˜ whtLt
 
+ nlt
 
AtL
 y
t   ˜  lt   ˜ wltLt   t
f
t
 
  kvt (11)
where ˜  it and ˜ witLt are respectively the average intermediate input cost and wage paid to a worker
in a productive employment relationship of skill i in period t.
Value of Unemployment
A high-skilled unemployed worker obtains ﬂow utility b while not working. If he matches with
a ﬁrm, which happens with probability qw
t = m( t) , and the intermediate input cost for the ﬁrm
is below the threshold, ¯  ht+1, he becomes a productive worker in the following period. If the search
process is not successful, he may lose the skill with probability  , becoming low-skilled unemployed.
If he does not enter into an employment relationship with a ﬁrm and does not lose the skill, he
remains as high-skilled unemployed. Hence:
Uht = b + Et 1 t
 
 qw
t
¯  ht+1  
 min
Nht+1 ( t+1)dF ( t+1) + (1   qw
t F (¯  ht+1))( Ult+1 + (1    )Uht+1)
 
 .
(12)
Analogously, the present value for a low-skilled unemployed worker is:
Ult = b + Et 1 t
 
 qw
t
¯  lt+1  
 min
Nlt+1 ( t+1)dF ( t+1) + (1   qw
t F (¯  lt+1))Ult+1
 
 . (13)
Value of Employment
As in the case of the ﬁrm, the value of a match for a worker is a function of the idiosyncratic shock
 t. It also depends on the skill of the worker. The value of employment for a high-skilled worker is
composed of the high-skilled wage, the disutility in terms of consumption from supplying labor, and
the continuation value, which is the value of being employed if the match is not destroyed, or the
value of being high-skilled unemployed if employment is exogenously or endogenously destroyed.
Nht ( t)=wht ( t)Lt  
h(Lt)
 t
(14)
+Et 1 t
 
 (1    x)
 
 
¯  ht+1  
 min
Nht+1 ( t+1)dF ( t+1) + (1   F (¯  ht+1))Uht+1
 
  +  xUht+1
 
 .
11Similarly, the present value for a low-skilled employed worker is:
Nlt ( t)=wlt ( t)Lt  
h(Lt)
 t
  tw
t (15)
+Et 1 t
 
 (1    x)
 
 
¯  ht+1  
 min
Nht+1 ( t+1)dF ( t+1) + (1   F (¯  ht+1))Uht+1
 
  +  xUlt+1
 
 .
Surplus, wages, hours and worker ﬂows
When an employment relationship takes place, it creates a surplus which is shared between the
ﬁrm and the worker. The surplus of the match is deﬁned as the sum of the values of a ﬁlled job
for a ﬁrm and a worker minus their outside options, which are the value of a vacancy and the value
of unemployment, respectively. The expression for the surplus is Sit ( t)=Jit ( t)+Nit ( t)   Uit
with i = {l,h}. The sharing rule for the surplus is obtained as the Nash solution to a bargaining
problem, which results in a constant fraction for each party. Let  w be the bargaining power of
the worker, then Nit ( t)   Uit =  wSit ( t) and Jit ( t) = (1    w)Sit ( t). Combining these two
expressions with equations (9) to (15), we can obtain the surplus in terms of units of consumption
for both high and low-skilled matches.
The division of the surplus between ﬁrm and worker yields the wage paid to the employee. The
expressions for the wages paid to a low and a high-skilled worker are respectively:
wht ( t)Lt =  w
 
 xtAtL
 y
t    t +  tqw
t Et
¯  ht+1  
 min
Jht+1dF ( t+1)
 
  (16)
+(1    w)
 
h(Lt)
u  (Ct)
+ b    t (1   qw
t F (¯  ht+1)) Et (Uht+1   Ult+1)
 
,
wlt ( t)Lt =  w
 
 xtAtL
 y
t    t +  tqw
t Et
¯  ll+1  
 min
Jlt+1dF ( t+1)
 
  (17)
+(1    w)
 
h(Lt)
u  (Ct)
+ b    tEt (1    x)(Uht+1   Ult+1)
 
.
The worker is compensated for a proportion  w of the production of the ﬁrm net of intermediate
input cost, and for a measure of the saved cost of searching for new matches. He is also compensated
12for a fraction (1    w) of the disutility from supplying labor, and for the foregone home production.
The wages also take into account the cost associated with the risk to the high-skilled unemployed
worker of becoming low-skilled. The total wages paid to the workers are deﬁned as
Wt   nht ˜ whtLt + nlt ˜ wltLt. (18)
The number of hours worked in every employment relationship is chosen to maximize the surplus
of the match. This is optimal for the ﬁrm and the worker since both the surplus and the wages
depend on L. The optimal number of hours is given by the following expression:
Lt =
 
xt yA t
an
  1
1+ n  y
. (19)
The optimal amount of hours supplied by the worker depends positively on the technology level
and negatively on the level of consumption, due to the decreasing marginal utility of consumption.
Because of the additive nature of the idiosyncratic cost, and the fact that both types of workers
are assumed to be equally productive, the optimal choice of hours does not depend on the cost of
intermediate inputs of the ﬁrm or the skill of the worker.
An employment relationship is terminated endogenously when the idiosyncratic intermediate
input cost of the ﬁrm is so high that it drives the surplus to zero. ¯  ht is such that Sht (¯  ht) = 0 .
¯  lt is deﬁned in the same way.
Given the timing and the decision rules of the agents, the evolution of the di erent employment
and unemployment pools is determined by the following equations:
uht =
 
1   qw
t 1F (¯  ht)
 
(1    )uht 1 +(  x + (1    x)(1   F (¯  ht)))nht 1 (20)
+ (1    x)(1   F (¯  ht))nlt 1,
ult =
 
1   qw
t 1F (¯  lt)
 
ult 1 +  xnlt 1 +
 
1   qw
t 1F (¯  ht)
 
 uht 1, (21)
nht = (1    x)F (¯  ht)nht 1 + (1    x)F (¯  ht)nlt 1 + qw
t 1F (¯  ht)uht 1, (22)
nlt = qw
t 1F (¯  lt)ult 1, (23)
1=ult + uht + nlt + nht. (24)
3.3 Retailers
There is a continuum of retail ﬁrms which operate in monopolistic competition. They buy interme-
diate goods, transform them one for one into retail goods and then sell them to the consumers.
13Deﬁne the quantity of retail good j sold as Yjt and let Pjt be its price. The ﬁnal good purchased
by the consumer, Yt, is
Yt =
 
 
1  
0
Y
  1
 
jt dj
 
 
 
  1
, (25)
where   is the elasticity of substitution between retail goods and is assumed to be greater than one.
The demand for retail good i and the aggregate price at time t are:
Yjt =
 
Pjt
Pt
   
Yt, (26)
Pt =
 
 
1  
0
P1  
jt di
 
 
1
1  
. (27)
The previous expressions allow us to write the total proﬁts made by the retailers as
 r
t+i =
1  
0
 
Pjt
Pt
  xt
 
Yjtdj.
Following Calvo (1983), we assume that in every period, a fraction (1    ) of retailers can change
their prices. Hence, the aggregate price can be expressed as
Pt =
 
 P1  
t 1 + (1    ) ˜ P1  
t
  1
1   , (28)
where ˜ Pt is the average price set by the ﬁrms that can change prices. At the individual level, retailers
who can re-optimize choose their prices by solving the following problem:
max
Pjt
Et 1
   
i=0
 i t+i
 
Pjt
Pt+i
  xt+i
 
Yjt,t+i,
which yields the following optimal condition:
˜ Pjt = µ Et 1
   
i=0
 jt,t+ixn
t+i. (29)
µ  =  
  1 is the ﬂexible price markup, xn
t = Ptxt is the nominal marginal cost and
 jt,t+i =
 i t+iRjt,t+i
Et 1
   
k=0
 k t+kRjt,t+k
, (30)
14where Rjt,t+s denotes the expected revenues of ﬁrm j at time t + s. In equilibrium all optimizing
ﬁrms choose the same price, ˜ Pt:
˜ Pt = µ Et 1
   
i=0
 i t+iRt,t+i
Et 1
   
k=0
 k t+kRt,t+k
xn
t+i.
After performing a ﬁrst-order Taylor approximation around a zero-inﬂation steady state, the
retailer side of the economy can be summarized in the following well-known aggregate supply equa-
tion:
Et 1ˆ  t =  xˆ xt +  Et 1ˆ  t+1, (31)
where ˆ  t = logPt+1 logPt and ˆ xt = logxt logx,  x =
(1  )(1   )
  and x is the steady state value
of the price of the intermediate goods. This equation, which is standard in business cycle models
with monopolistic competition and staggered prices in the style of Calvo (1983), states that current
inﬂation is a positive function of the prices of intermediate inputs and future inﬂation.
3.4 Monetary authority
The monetary authority sets the nominal interest rate in the economy following a Taylor rule.
Nominal interest rates are subject to monetary policy shocks,  m
t   iid(0,  ). Let      1 and
 y   0 represent the weights of the Central Bank on inﬂation and output gap when setting the
monetary policy, then
rn
t =  r
 
rn
t 1
  m Et
 
Pt+1
Pt
   (1  m)  
Yt
Y
  y(1  m)
e m
t . (32)
3.5 Equilibrium
This economy can be supported as a recursive competitive equilibrium.
4 Parametrization
In this section, we present the procedure followed to parametrize the model. The values for a
subset of the parameters are chosen following other studies, and what has become standard in the
literature. The values for the other parameters are calibrated to match the empirical evidence from
the Spanish economy for the long run values of the variables in the model, which would correspond
to the steady state.
15The length of a period is one quarter. The discount factor of the economy is   =0 .99, which
using the Euler equation (5) implies a quarterly real interest rate of 2 percent in the steady state.
The production function is assumed to be constant returns to scale, so  y =1 . The results of the
simulations are robust to changes in this parameter. Setting it equal to 0.66, as in a standard
production function with capital, does not alter the results presented in the next section. The
steady state labor supply is assumed to be L =1 /3, which implies that on average, 8 hours per
working day are devoted to work. The level of technology, A , is normalized to 1.
The ﬂow value of unemployment or home production, b, has been a subject of debate in recent
years. Shimer (2005) sets its value such that the ratio of home production to the surplus ﬂow
(critical to make wages more or less responsive to productivity shocks, which in his model coincides
with the productivity of the ﬁrm), z
p in his model, is 0.4. More recently, Hagedorn and Manovskii
(2008) set its value such that the ratio z
p is 0.955. In our model, we choose b so that the ratio of home
production to the surplus ﬂow is 60%, which is between the numbers in the previous two papers,
and set it to b =0 .033. Changing this parameter within reasonable bounds does not alter the main
conclusions of the paper. Following Mortensen and Pissarides (1994), the bargaining power of the
worker is set to  w =0 .5.
The parameters in the utility function are  c =1and  n =1 , which imply log-utility in
consumption and quadratic disutility from labor supply. We follow Walsh (2005) and Trigari (2009)
and set the habit persistence parameter, e, to 0.55. an is calibrated using the optimal labor supply,
equation (19), and the steady state levels of hours, technology, and consumption. We set to an =
14.1.
The matching function is assumed to be constant returns to scale and to take the following
functional form, m(ut,v t)=µu m
t v1  m
t . Following Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) we set  m =
0.5. The probability of leaving unemployment in Spain is set to 0.3, following Bover et al. (2002).
After Shimer (2005) we set the market tightness of the economy,  , to unity. Changing this value
does not a ect the results, since it only rescales the parameter µ in the matching function without
any e ect in the results, as Shimer (2005) explains. Using OECD quarterly data from 1982:1 to
2005:4 6, the unemployment rate is set to 0.15. In our sample of Spanish data, the proportion of
unemployment lasting longer than 12 months is 0.55, hence we set the proportion of the low-skilled
unemployed to 0.55 of total unemployment. Using these two probabilities and the steady state ﬂow
equations from the model, we obtain a steady state value for   of 0.42, which implies that the
probability at the beginning of the period of loss of skill is 0.25, or that on average a high-skilled
6OECD International Statistics Yearbook.
16unemployed worker takes one year to lose the skill. This average duration of skill deterioration
allows us to make the comparison between the low-skilled unemployed workers in the model and the
long-term unemployed in the data. Given the steady state unemployment rates and the probabilities
of leaving unemployment and losing the skill, the destruction rate in the steady state is 0.053. For
lack of better estimates, we assume that the exogenous destruction is 68 percent of total destruction,
which is the same proportion which is used for U.S. calibrations, and has been estimated by Davis,
Haltiwanger and Schuh (1996). Hence,  x =0 .036. The scaling parameter in the matching function
is calibrated using the equilibrium ﬂow equations, and set to µ =0 .42.
Bover et al. (2002) calculate the probability of exiting unemployment as a function of unemploy-
ment duration. They estimate that for the Spanish economy, this probability is reduced by half for
workers who have been unemployed for a whole year. Since the matching probability is the same
for both types of workers, and the di erence in the probability of transition from unemployment to
employment for low-skilled workers is marked by the training cost, we set this cost to t =0 .57 so
that the probability of a successful match for a low-skilled worker is half of that for a high-skilled
one.
Following Gali and Gertler (1999) we set the probability of changing prices for the retailers,  ,
to 0.85. We set the steady state mark-up of the intermediate goods ﬁrms to µ  =1 .1, which implies
an elasticity of substitution between intermediate goods of   = 11, as in Walsh (2005) and Trigari
(2009).
The monetary shock follows an iid process  m
t   N
 
0, 2
z
 
, where the value  2
z does not a ect the
impulse responses of the model. The parameters in the Taylor rule follow the estimates of Favero
and Marcellino (2001) for their benchmark speciﬁcation of the Taylor rule for Spain, and we set
 m =0 .912,   =1 .5, y =1 .74. r =0 .19 is chosen such that the nominal interest rate in the
steady state is equal to the real rate.
The idiosyncratic shock to the ﬁrm is assumed to be distributed as an exponential    
1
 
e
 
 
 ,
where   is jointly obtained along with all of the remaining steady state variables of the economy
through the steady state equilibrium of the model. We set   =0 .0997.
Table 1 summarizes the main parameters of the model.
Table 1
175 Results
We provide two kinds of results. First, we compare the impulse responses of our two-skills model
with the empirical responses shown in Section 2. At the same time, we compare our speciﬁcation
against a model with only one skill in order to understand where a model with loss of skill signiﬁes
an improvement over a model with a less heterogeneous labor market. Second, we test how robust
the results are to changes in the probability of losing the skill,  , in the habit persistence parameter,
e, and in the rate of autocorrelation of the monetary policy instrument,  m.7
Figures 3 and 5 show the results of our two speciﬁcations of the VAR against the responses to a
100 basis points increase in the annualized interest rate for the model with two skills and the model
with only one skill. The dashed line and the light solid line represent the responses of the model
with one and two skills, respectively, to the monetary shock. The dark solid line is the response in
the data, and the dotted lines are the 95 percent conﬁdence intervals.
All of the variables respond to the monetary shock showing the expected pattern: output,
inﬂation, and hours decrease, and unemployment increases. The intuition is as follows. After an
increase in the nominal interest rate, consumers face a higher trade-o  between present and future
consumption due to the increased returns on savings. Some current consumption is delayed to the
future, which creates a drop in demand. Due to price rigidities, retailers cannot fully adjust their
prices and instead reduce production to meet the decreased demand. The drop in ﬁnal output
reduces the demand by retailers of intermediate goods. Lower demand for intermediate goods
produces a drop in the proﬁts of those types of ﬁrms, which reduces the desirability of labor market
matches. This drives a decrease in the creation of jobs and an increase in their destruction, since now
some of the previous matches are not proﬁtable. Lower creation and higher destruction reduce the
employment level and increase unemployment. The higher unemployment level, together with the
reduced proﬁts for the ﬁrms, decrease the probability that unemployed workers match with ﬁrms.
Over time, some of the high-skilled workers see their skills deteriorate and they become low-skilled,
a state in which they have an even lower probability of ﬁnding work. The lower re-employment
chances of low-skilled workers, together with the higher fraction of those types of workers in the
unemployment pool, reduces the average job-ﬁnding rate in the economy. This, in turn, produces the
more persistent response of unemployment and other variables. While the increase in unemployment
occurs slowly, hours worked sharply decrease during the period after the shock due to the lack of
frictions when adjusting the intensive labor margin. At the same time, some of the e ects of the
7The model has been solved and simulated using Dynare, version 3.05. (http://www.cepremap.cnrs.fr/dynare)
18initial shock are undone by the monetary authority. The use of the Taylor rule allows the monetary
authority to reduce the gap in output and the inﬂation generated by the increase in the interest
rates.
Looking at Figure 3, we can see that in general, the model is able to replicate the behavior
observed in the data for the main variables analyzed, and that all of the responses are signiﬁcant,
staying within the 95 percent conﬁdence intervals, except for hours. The model tracks the response
of output well. Output peaks in the second period and dies out in the same quarter in which the
empirical response crosses the zero axes. Inﬂation in the model is as responsive as in the data but
it converges back to the steady state faster, although it is always within the 95 percent conﬁdence
intervals 8.
If we compare the simulations for the two di erent models, the one-skill and the two-skills models,
we observe that the latter delivers a more pronounced and persistent response of unemployment,
and is a better match to the data. The two-skills model also produces an almost identical response
for the interest rate and is a good ﬁt for output and inﬂation.
Figure 3
The most interesting part of the result is the response of unemployment, where the model
with two skills is able to generate a bigger and more persistent response than the model with one
skill. Figure 4, which plots the responses of total, high and low-skilled unemployment after the
monetary shock together, provides more insight into the response of unemployment. High-skilled
unemployment peaks before low-skilled and goes below the steady state after 5 quarters. The
low increase and eventual decrease in high-skilled unemployment is consistent with the arguments
expressed in den Haan et al. (2005). High-skilled workers realize that if they become unemployed,
they face the possibility of skill loss and a subsequent decrease in their probability of re-employment.
Hence, following a negative monetary shock, high-skilled workers are less willing to terminate their
jobs. The ﬂow of high-skilled workers into unemployment is therefore not as big as it would be if there
were no loss of skill. Moreover, with time some of the high-skilled unemployed workers lose their
skill, and this further reduces the pool of the high-skilled unemployed. Low-skilled unemployment
has a more pronounced and sluggish response to the negative monetary shock. It peaks after 5
quarters and returns to the steady state more slowly. This more responsive and persistent behavior
8One way that has been suggested in the literature to generate a more persistent response of inﬂation, i.e. Walsh
(2005), is to assume that a fraction of the ﬁrms which are allowed to change prices are backward-looking and update
their prices using a rule of thumb according to the last period’s inﬂation.
19of low-skilled unemployment drives the better ﬁt of the two-skills model compared to the model
with one skill.
Figure 4
The model, however, does not fully match the timing of the response of unemployment. Even
though the loss of skill mechanism is able to generate a more sluggish response on unemployment,
it cannot replicate the very delayed peak observed in the data. The VAR analysis shows that
unemployment peaks after 7 quarters, whereas the model response peaks after 4. The reason for
this early peak in the model lies in the nature of the search and matching model, where shocks
have an immediate e ect on unemployment. Following a negative shock, destruction increases and
creation drops, generating a very quick increase in unemployment. Since the focus of theis paper
is in analyzing the e ect of the loss of skill following a monetary shock, we have abstracted from
features of the model such as ﬁring restrictions, which could bring a more delayed response for
unemployment. We can see that this early response of the model is also observed when looking at
the response of high and low-skilled unemployment in Figure 5. Both variables peak several quarters
before the data, although the magnitude of the response of low-skilled unemployment in the data
is well matched by the model. High-skilled unemployment in the model also peaks early and is of
insu cient magnitude.
The behavior of hours worked is not completely satisfactory. In both the one and two-skills
models, hours react too strongly to the monetary policy shock, decreasing more than in the data.
However, the responses of the model are outside the conﬁdence bands only for the ﬁrst two quarters.
Figure 5
5.1 Robustness
We now show the robustness of the results to changes in the probability of losing the skill,  , in the
habit persistence parameter, e, and in the rate of autocorrelation of the monetary policy instrument,
 m. We see that the improved performance of the model with skill loss is maintained even when we
reduce the values assigned to these parameters in the benchmark calibration.
The rate of loss of skill is calibrated endogenously to match the steady state levels and ﬂows of
the labor market to the long-run labor market data. For this reason, changing the rate of loss of
skill implies having to adjust another ﬂow within the model in order to still match the employment
and unemployment levels from the data. To this end, we adjust the rate at which the low-skilled
20workers regain their skill after being hired. Until this point we have assumed that this skill upgrade
is done in just one period, but decreasing the ﬂow from high to low-skilled unemployment requires
decreasing the ﬂow from low to high-skilled employment. Hence, we re-derive the model for the
case when the skill upgrade occurs only with certain probability, and we calibrate the model again
to match the data 9.
Figure 6 shows the responses of output, total, high, and low-skilled unemployment for the
model with one skill and the model with two skills with   =0 .42,  =0 .27 and   =0 .16. The
three di erent values of the rate of loss of skill correspond respectively to the benchmark calibration
presented above, and to two calibrations where the skill upgrade occurs with probability 0.5 and
0.25. Also note that these three cases imply ex-ante probabilities of losing the skill of 0.25, 0.16 and
0.1 respectively. We can observe in Figure 6 that the model with two skills still delivers a higher
and more sluggish response of unemployment than the model with one skill, even when we assume
that the rate of loss of skill is lower than the one presented in Figures 3 to 5. The response of output
does not change substantially as we decrease  . However, as expected, the change in the rate of
skill loss does a ect the response of high and low-skilled unemployment. On the one hand, when  
decreases, high-skilled unemployment takes longer to peak and to decrease below the steady state.
This conﬁrms the intuition given above: high-skilled workers are less reluctant to terminate their
jobs if the threat of skill loss is lower. On the other hand, it is also natural that as we decrease  ,
low-skilled unemployment peaks earlier and returns more quickly to the steady state, since there is
a lower ﬂow from the high-skilled unemployment pool.
Figure 6
Trigari (2006) shows that the habit persistence parameter has a big role in determining the
persistence of the response of inﬂation. We perform a similar experiment in our model showing the
responses of the two main variables of interest, output and unemployment, when we assume that
there are no consumption habits (e =0 ). Figure 7 shows that consumption habits are not crucial in
delivering the main result of our model. The response of unemployment remains high and persistent
in both models. As expected, and similarly to Trigari (2006), the response of output is bigger when
we set e =0 . Without consumption habits, consumption and output decrease sharply due to
the decrease in demand, and the model no longer delivers a humped shape for output. As in the
previous literature, we justify the introduction of consumption habits in order to match the delayed
9The derivation of the model with a di erent time upgrade of skill is available from the authors upon request.
21and persistent drop in output and consumption, although as we have shown, habit persistence is
not essential to the results concerning the comparison of the one and two-skills models.
Figure 7
Finally, following Walsh (2005), we change the persistence of the monetary policy instrument in
order to assess the importance of this parameter in the performance of the model. Figure 8 shows the
behavior of unemployment and output when we assume that the monetary policy instrument has no
autoregressive term ( m =0 ). It is clear from the graph that the extra persistence of the response of
unemployment in the two-skills model is not driven by the persistence of the interest rate. However,
as already noted by Walsh (2005), the magnitude of the responses of output and unemployment
become very small without the persistence of the monetary shock. Hence, although the magnitude
of the response depends crucially on the persistence of the shock, the higher persistence of the model
with skill deterioration does not.
Figure 8
6 Conclusion
This paper develops a new Keynesian model enriched with a search and matching labor market. We
introduce two kinds of rigidities in the model, Calvo price setting for retail ﬁrms and search frictions
in the labor market. The innovative feature of the model is the inclusion in the labor market of two
types of unemployed workers, high and low-skilled, which transition from the former to the latter
when unemployed for an extended period of time.
The paper shows that the loss of skill mechanism helps explain the magnitude and persistence
in the response of unemployment and other real and nominal variables to a monetary policy shock
in economies which su er from high unemployment and high long-term unemployment. Economies
such as those of the European countries are perfect candidates to test our theory, and we thus
estimate a VAR for a representative case of the European unemployment problem, Spain. We
follow the approach of Christiano et al. (2000) and compare the responses of the simulations of our
model with the ones of the data. Analyzing the results, we see that the model with loss of skill is
able to generate a higher and more persistent response of unemployment following a monetary shock
than a model which does not include this mechanism, even for di erent values of the rate of loss
of skill, habit persistence in consumption, and persistence of the monetary policy instrument. The
22two-skills model also performs well when trying to match the magnitude and the persistence of the
responses of output and inﬂation to a monetary shock. The model, however, is not able generate as
much persistence in unemployment as that shown by the data, even with the inclusion of the loss
of skill. Extensions in the labor market modeling in the line of ﬁring restrictions or other rigidities
which are found in the European labor markets would help to close this gap with the data.
Finally, it should be clear from this paper that the study of the heterogeneity of the labor
force is important to explain cyclical ﬂuctuations. One such heterogeneity, to be explored in future
research, is that generated by workers out of the labor force, whose participation decisions can alter
the dynamics of the economy and hence have an impact on cyclical ﬂuctuations.
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26Table 1: Parameters of the Model
Exogenous Parameters
  =0 .99  c =1 e =0 .55  n =1
 y =1 A =1  w =0 .5  m =0 .5
 x =0 .36   =0 .2   =0 .85
 m =0 .97    =1 .02  y =1 .4
Calibrated Parameters
  =0 .42 t =0 .57 k =0 .036 b =0 .033
an = 14.05 µ =0 .45   =0 .099  r =0 .053
27Figure 1: Impulse Responses of Output, Inﬂation, Unemployment and Interest rates of the Spanish
Economy to 100 basis points positive shock to the interest rate
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28Figure 2: Impulse Responses of Short-term and Long-term Unemployment of the Spanish Economy
to 100 basis points positive shock to the interest rate
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29Figure 3: Impulse Responses of Output, Inﬂation, Unemployment and Interest rates of the Spanish
Economy and of the Model to 100 basis points positive shock to the interest rate
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30Figure 4: Impulse Responses of Total, High and Low-Skilled Unemployment of the Model to 100
basis points positive shock to the interest rate
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Figure 5: Impulse Responses of High and Low-Skilled Unemployment of the Model to 100 basis
points positive shock to the interest rate
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31Figure 6: Impulse Responses of Output, Total, High and Low-Skilled Unemployment of the Model
to 100 basis points positive shock to the interest rate for di erent values of the Loss of the Skill
Rate
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32Figure 7: Impulse Responses of Output and Total Unemployment of the Model to 100 basis points
positive shock to the interest rate with no habit persitence in consumption (e =0 ).
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Figure 8: Impulse Responses of Output and Total Unemployment of the Model to 100 basis points
positive shock to the interest rate with no autocorrelation in the interest rate ( m =0 ).
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